THE CONTEXT OF THE PRIVATIZATION *

1.
Since 1912 and until the 80's Argentinean water services were provided by a national corporation, Obras Sanitarias de la Nación, (National Water and Sewerage). Central authorities enacted regulations, designed rates and planned service expansion. The highest priority was structural investment, while efficiency was disregarded. The national treasury funded the system and guaranteed financing. The system disregarded economic and financial considerations, setting political rates and tariffs.
1 Yet, a policy of subsidized cross subsidies allowed expansion to the less developed and populated areas of the country. The system broke down due to the recurrent fiscal crises of the national government, which prevented limitless transfer of funds. From 1976 to 1982 Argentina kept an artificial rate of exchange, with the government subsidizing artificial exchange rates, and devoting significant parts of national funding to it. Resources for other activities were reduced. National Water and Sewerage suffered. As a result there was a sequential halting of activities. Expansion stopped first, and maintenance and rehabilitation deteriorated.
3.
In 1982, the crisis of the debt incurred to finance an artificial rate of exchange exploded. Public financing become even more limited. The national system was transferred to the provinces, and 161 service areas were transferred. The provinces kept the original national philosophy, for a while. A main problem was that no alternatives to previous national and crossnational subsidies were provided for. 3 Water and Sewerage was not a financial priority for the National Government, or for that matter, for the provinces. Thereafter the system collapsed. The crisis affected quality and coverage; as well as policies, planning and regulation.
4.
In Buenos Aires it was clear that the state company was unable to meet investment and maintenance needs. Structural macro-reasons included, inter alia, public inability to fund the system in a country where the main priority was shared by external debt and financing an artificial rate of exchange. Sector-specific reasons related to the vices and practices of an overmanned public company with strong, highly politicized, labor unions, and a short-term view of the social aspects of public utility water services.
5.
At the time of the concession, only 70 per cent of the population of the Metropolitan Area (MA) had water supply, while just 58 per cent were connected to the sewerage system. Most of the unconnected lived in the poorer areas of MA, where the percentages above were 55% and 36% respectively. The shortfall in the poorer areas had been growing by 5 to 6 percent per year, totaling 5.6 million people. On the other hand, the dwellers of the city proper were almost entirely connected. The state company was not even able to maintain existing assets. Unaccounted for water reached 45 percent. Real water tariffs were low. Consumers had no incentive to either conserve, or to pay, since unpaying consumers could not be cut off. Rivers and groundwater were polluted by septic tanks, cesspools and direct discharge of untreated sewage and industrial effluent. 4 
6.
The system has abundant, and cheap raw water. Transport is also cheap. 5 It was deemed that favorable physical conditions, the professional type of management afforded by the private sector, 6 and the making of postponed investments would definitely improve the conditions of the service.
7.
In this context the concession was launched with a sense of urgency. 7 It was granted to a consortia of companies, private, foreign and national, by contract, which did also contain regulatory principles. As we shall see, urgency affected outcome.
8.
At the time of Buenos Aires Privatization (end 1992, beginning 1993) foreign currencies were kept artificially low in order to preserve currency stabilization (much in the same way it was done in 1976-1982, and with the same, but magnified, disastrous results). The state intervened heavily in the currencies market, borrowing and buying foreign currency and selling it in the local market. Debt and unemployment went up. Local production and fiscal revenue came down. In 1976 Argentina had an external debt of 6 billion dollars, accumulated since 1810. By 2001, year of the crisis, external debt was unmanageable. Unemployment was rampant, and shops were looted by hungry mobs.
9.
The years of the Buenos Aires privatization were also a period of trust in private markets, and distrust of Governments. It was assumed that market disputability, competition for the market, rate regulation according to price cap mechanisms, light regulation, and information substitutes, would make up for the information asymmetries and market, state, and system failures well researched in neoliberal economics.
• Distrust of governments prompted regulatory systems with weak information requirements .
8
• Overoptimistic assumptions, such as those based on notions that market contestability reduces the need for regulation, also affected regulatory quality. According to the theory, efficient pricing and production can be forced upon a supplier by the threat of competition, just as well as by actual competition. However, while as an abstract construct the theory has gained considerable currency: "its impact on regulatory policies in relation to natural monopolies has been much less significant, simply because the assumptions of perfect contestability on which it is based, notably that the entrant can leave the market, without costs, when it is no longer profitable to remain, are rarely
• It was assumed that, if competition in the market is limited, competition for the market creates some sort of substitute competition, theoretically reducing the needs for regulation and information. Yet, the exercise has been fraught with difficulties.
10
• In many cases, privatization laws and regulations have applied theoretical price cap systems to regulate the earnings of providers. In practice, in the English experience, the system was affected by several problems, including the fact that it required a good deal of information, in order to establish cost reduction potentials.
11
.
10.
The concession is now under discussion and review. Both sides are unhappy. The company would like to have a dollar-based revenue system. 12 The government claims that investments were not made as promised. Better understanding of the impact of economic macro-context and improved regulation and practices would have saved a great deal of sorrow to both parties.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE
11.
In Buenos Aires, there is no liberalization in the sense of competition. A private foreign monopolist now provides the service. The provider won a bid based on a 26.9% tariff reduction offer (tariffs had been increased by 62 %, ahead of privatization, and a VAT of 18% had also been added), associated to an expansion program. There were to be new connections paid by the concessionaire. Yet, the high cost, relative to income, of infrastructure charges deterred payment by prospective low-income new users.
12.
The concession left in place an opaque and inefficient tariff system. Consumers are charged a flat rate, according to type of use (residential, non-residential, real state) and service (water; or water and sewerage); they are adjusted according to location, plot size, constructed area, and type of construction. The system contained large cross subsidies between rich and poor customers. This was in fact an incentive to serve first to rich areas, which pay more. Flat rates did not encourage savings, and expanded coverage in rich areas induce the company to slow expansion to poor areas if returns did not justify investments. The encountered in practice" Ogus Anthony, "Regulation, Legal Form and Economic Theory", Clarendon Law Series, Oxford, 1994; p. 33 10 In the case of Buenos Aires it is argued that the bidding process encouraged the companies to offer the highest possible rate of discount, to renegotiate later, if needed. Furthermore, once the concession is awarded it is a monopoly, with the incumbent enjoying an almost total advantage over potential competitors. The small number of actual bidders participating in the adjudication contest reinforced the inherently monopolistic nature of the concession process.Ferro Gustavo, "El Servicio Publico de Agua Potable y Saneamiento en Buenos Aires, Privatizacion y Regulacion" , Buenos Aires, 1999. This agrees with data on limited number of bidders in most water supply and sanitation biddings provided by Vivien Foster at the "Primer Encuentro de Entes Reguladores de las Americas", Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Octubre, 2001. 11 In its initial English version it resulted in weak accountability and lack of procedural safeguards. This problem, the reliance of regulators on information provided by firms, and the history of bargaining between them, all suggest that the system may not be as resistant to the influence of private interests as its proponents hoped Ogus, op. cit. p. 312/313. 12 La Nacion, Buenos Aires, 24 de Enero de 2005. option to meter consumption did create an incentive for the company to meter poor households, (because of the peculiarities of local rate design, it is profitable for the company to meter when the variable charge is more than half of the fixed rate). Returns in poor areas in fact did not justify investment, since poor areas could not even pay the infrastructure charge. It is also charged that the hybrid price cap system of the concession, by allowing adjustments between periods if a cumulative index of specific costs escalated beyond 7%, reduced incentives to keep costs down. 13 13.
The original contract provided for sequential investments. Water coverage was 70 % and was supposed to be of 90 % by 2013 and 100 % by 2023. Sewerage was supposed to increase to 73 % by 2013 and 90 % by 2023, from 57 % at the beginning of the concession.
14.
Yet, the contract did not provide for incentives functional to the goals. Tariffs were globally estimated as mean long term cost. Thus, tariffs were suppose to generate demand related income enough to recover, within 30 years, operational costs, investment costs, and the costs of capital outlays or profit, required to make the investments committed. The estimates discounted in advance revenues required to pay for total concession costs. In practice this is tantamount to an incentive to delay investments, since once the company has collected the tariffs, it makes an economic profit by delaying investment. Lacking adequate supervision and control, there was a perverse incentive not to comply with the investment plan. 14 15.
There were more disincentives: a) the rates paid in poorer areas were based on lower indexes than the rates paid in other areas, since rates were not based on consumption, but on property valuation; b) to supply such areas represent a higher investment in infrastructure, as well as relatively higher costs in transportation, distribution and recollection; c) poorer areas represent higher commercial and collection risks; d) cost of connections, at the front of properties, discouraged users, which were accustomed to discharge into septic tanks at the back; e) infrastructure charges were too high to be paid by the poorest sectors of the population; f) the problems associated to a non-performing economy were not considered.
16.
Up to 2000 the tools of choice, to ensure universal services, were cross subsidies to expansion, and the infrastructure charge, later substituted by universal service charge, and works by third parties 17.
New programs were implemented in 2001 and 2002: a) Social Tariff (PST): it is a cross-subsidy to demand. Selected beneficiaries get targeted discounts, based on social polls; b) Program for Poor Neighborhoods (PPN): secondary networks are constructed with Municipal, beneficiaries, and Concessionaire contributions. Tariffs have discounts.
18.
The Program of Social Tariff Beneficiaries is based on polls designed by the Regulator. It will be audited to correct mistakes and deviations. It benefits 80.000 households and 300.000 people. Poor neighborhoods have location specificities that make leakage, to non targeted users, difficult.
19.
The costs of the new programs for the poor are not significant for ETOSS and AA. For the Social Tariff Program, Municipal Costs, at the identification stage, have some magnitude, since municipalities had to constitute special working teams. ETOSS spends 110.000 pesos per year, and the 18 participating municipalities spend 350.000 pesos per year, hiring 69 people. The program administers 4.000.000 pesos per year.The PPN has an administrative cost of $ 500.000, to AA.
20.
The concession did not include a main goal of promoting innovative technologies. The PPN utilizes methods and supplies adjusted to the needs of emergency neighborhoods, without compromising the quality reached by the Concession. Self-help is being utilized, and the sewerage utilizes the system of "sewerage without solids"
IMPACTS OF THE CHANGE: THE SITUATION OF THE POOR
21.
The bidding proposal ensured a theoretical reasonable rate between income and investment. The problem was that actual income did not match expectations. Total actual coverage increased by 4% for water, by 1996/7, while it decreased by 3% for sewerage. According to Suez, Buenos Aires was a "sick system". The contract was prepared "with total inadequacy, or even absence of, of reliable information, data, records and measures".
16 Already in 1994 the company did take a loan from IFC that could only be repaid if there were rate increases or investment reductions.
17
. Both the paucity of data, and the loan suggest a reasonable expectation of renegotiation. This, in turn, may justify the claims that the bidder was opportunistic and the offer predatory.
23.
Poor prospective users may have not been favored by such context. Although the contract explicitly establishes that governments did not assume responsibility for factual accuracy 18 , the information issue justified, among other factors, renegotiations. 
24.
Costs of expanding the secondary network plus the connection cost had to be paid by new users, plus modifications within the house. New connections were a problem for the poor. The charge would represent about 18% of the income of a poor household. And some 85% of the unconnected were either poor or low income. Connection was compulsory, where available. Tariffs, and connection and infrastructure charges, for both water and sewerage, were increased in 1994.
25.
Affordability problems prompted contract renegotiation. SUMA (universal service and environmental charge) was created in 1997, and lower connection charges for new users were implemented. Expansion was cut (15% for water, 13 % for sewerage, first 5 years). The average water bill of already connected customers went up by 19%, while for new consumers it came down by 74 %. SUMA was paid in advance, which reduced the leverage of government to ensure that works were timely completed. 20 While expansion was reduced, tariffs, based on expansion promises, were not lowered. The $700 million not invested mostly affected the poor of greater Buenos Aires. 
26.
One of the problems of the concession is that there is not agreed methodology to establish compliance with targets. The concessionaire counts as compliance works done by third parties and legalization of existing informal connections. Other, argument that such expansion should not be credited to the concessionaire. If legalized and third party works are counted, the rate of compliance during the first five years of the concession would be 70% of contracted works, both for water and sewerage. It they are not, the rate of compliance falls to 40% for water and 20% for sewerage. Thus non-compliance, seven years after initiated the concession, would be 41% for water and 56% for sewerage. 22 There are also claims that average water bills increased by 63 % as of Jan, 1999, 23 although increases were banned during the first ten years of the concession.
27.
As of 2001 only 39% of the households of the Conurbano had water and sewerage. Only 66 % had water. Just 40 % had sewerage. And 33 % had none. Fifty six percent of the households of the poorest decile do not had either water or sewerage, while 83% of the decile had no sewerage. 28.
There were no direct subsidies, until 2001, although the poorest households, with service access, spent 1.1% percentage of their income on water and sanitation, while the richest decile spent 0.3 %.
25 At the same time, the evolution of coverage between 1987 and 1997 shows that, as of 1997, 50% and 30 % of the two poorest quintiles of the population of Metropolitan Buenos Aires had no access to water supply, while 73% and 55% had no access to sewerage.
26
. The conclusion is that the regulation and programming of the concession should have been more pro-poor. 27 29.
As we have seen above, new programs for the poor were started in 2001 and 2002. There is some satisfaction with them, but they do not allow complying with universal service objectives. There are now 1.800.000 people without water and 3.000.000 without sewerage. Only 10% of effluent is treated. The comparison between agreed results and effective achievements of the concession show that, after nine years, water coverage reaches 79 % of the population (against a target of 88%), with 800.000 people deficit; sewerage reaches 63%, short of the target by 11%, with 1.032.000 people deficit; primary sewage treatment is 7%, against a target of 74% and a deficit of 6.180.100 people; and investment has been of 1.342.000 against a target of 2.202.200 million, and a deficit of 859.400 million. 28 
30.
Renegotiations, inadequate starting data and defective evaluation of the economic capacity of served population, plus the crisis of 2002 resulted in non-compliance of agreed targets. Measures such as the STP, and PPN, while effective, do not make up for the lack of investment commensurate to the magnitude of problems 
REGULATIONS
4.1
Conflicts between equity and efficiency. Conflict resolution and sectoral characteristics
31.
Systems with a long-standing history of private provision of public utility services record an often seen conflict between private and public interests. One aims for maximized profit. The other for adequate service at the lowest possible price. The conflict is more apparent than real, since a public utility can not maximize profit in the long run without providing adequate service at reasonable price. On the other hand the public cannot expect to receive services from companies, which are not financially healthy. 29 Thus, it hinges on regulation -lacking competition -to ensure a balance, whereby efficiency gains-or parts of them-are passed to the users.
32.
Thus, market failures-such as a legally reinforced monopoly-and government limitations, make a case for good regulation, as a means to overcome the limitations resulting from lack of competition. Yet, regulation is conflictive and analytically demanding. 30 And here is where the clues to understand the problems of Buenos Aires-in addition to what in retrospective comes out as a defective structural assessment of the sustainability of the economic system-are.
33.
In 2000, before the Argentinean debacle, the World Bank already warned that: The Buenos Aires privatization of water utility services, their information shortcomings, lack of transparency in regulatory decisions and ad hoc nature of executive branch interventions, make it difficult to reassure consumers that their welfare is being protected, and that the concession is sustainable. 
34.
In similar terms, but with after-the-fact-foresight, The Economist stated that: In Argentina it has been said that privatizations were sweet deals, with public utilities becoming private, rather than public monopolies. Rates in long-term contracts were updated according to American inflation, even if prices in Argentina were falling down. Dollar interest rates were high, even if in theory risk was low. 32 
35.
Thus, the conflicts between equity and efficiency in the relationship societycompany (without considering the problem of the poor that were addressed before) where not properly addressed by regulation. Regulation and control were weak, and political authorities routinely by-passed the regulator, as in the 1997 re-negotiation. 33 
36.
More specifically, the regulation process and the negotiation of the contract failed in terms of key tools relevant to enhance equity: ensuring that the provider equity participation were of a level commensurate to the magnitude of the operation, providing for good-quality technical diagnostics and information before privatization, providing means to recalculate tariffs without altering the value of concession when reducing expansion obligations, controlling transfer pricing and intra-holding contracts, providing for proper accounting, determining adequate ratios regarding equity/debt financing, and generally, ensuring that proper legal guarantees and procedures were built to prevent political capture of the regulatory process. 34 
37.
The conflicts associated to regulation require impartiality and technical knowledge to ensure equity in conflict adjudication processes. Yet, the Buenos Aires concession has become infamous for the bypassing of the regulator by political authorities in both, rate regulation processes and contract renegotiation. 35 38.
There are other factors, connected to the global economy and its institutional framework, rather than to internal regulations or institutions, that may impinge on the equity aspects of the concession. The provider is a foreign investor entitled to the use of the investors-state arbitration procedure. Selection of a local forum, for conflict adjudication, as per contract, does not prevent an investor to resort to foreign arbitration, as illustrated by the Aguas del Aconquija case, also involving a water firm, active in Tucuman. In state arbitration cases investors usually pursue to keep a tariff level commensurate to contractual arrangements, and agreed adjustment provisions. Even if adjustments are in foreign currencies. Because of the crisis of 2002, the presidency of Aguas Argentinas submitted an emergency plan whereby all non emergency investment was suspended, and dollars were to be submitted to the company, at the old 1 to 1 exchange rate, to serve debt and buy inputs. 
39.
Aguas Argentinas was the first company to sign an agreement that put arbitration on hold until 31 st December, 2004. Yet, the agreement has expired and arbitration procedures raise several equity related concerns. Companies are requesting that tariffs be adjusted according to devaluation. Such adjustments may well go beyond the carrying capacity of the country and the paying capacity of users. Elsewhere, previous cases of national economic crisis, having the magnitude of Argentina's, have consistently found that tariffs can not increase above the rate of national economic growth.. 37 . Otherwise some economic actors would not be affected by the crisis, and be also a regressive factor.
40.
The practice to guarantee exchange rates is questioned. World Bank scholars have pointed out that such guarantees can wipe out the benefits of privatization, by dampening incentives to select and manage programs and projects efficiently. Thus, in the United States, at the time of the Depression, the Court recognized a decline in interest rates and business earnings throughout the country, and was willing to accept lower rates of returnPhillips, op. cit. p. 378, and cases quoted there. In addition: Wilcox Vs. Consolidated Gas, 212 US 19, 48-49 (1909) Lexis 135, Daytona Power, 1934; Chesapeake and Potomac, 1935; Driscoll, 1939. arguably necessary to fend off an economic depression, and even though ordinary argentines suffered greatly during the crisis" 
Regulatory Bodies
41.
Buenos Aires did not have a regulator prior to the concession. A regulator was created to control the concession. And in creating it the Government did in fact throw out the book. Almost every empirical and theoretical principle on organization of regulators was disregarded. The Buenos Aires regulator is a political body, with representatives from three levels of government, not a technical body. Its decisions may, therefore, be complicated by political considerations. In addition, is has been bypassed by the central government, who has taken decisions ignoring the views of the regulator. It was staffed with people from the former government agency. 39 Thus the regulator has divided loyalties, was inexperienced, had to work on one to one basis with a single regulated company, and lacked a universe allowing it to make comparisons among firms. Because of the theoretical underpinnings of the regulatory approach applied in Buenos Aires it was also weak, in terms of powers, capacity and information.
42.
It is however, well financed, with a surcharge on bills. While some authors have criticized the procedure, it responds to international practices. In the US financing comes from percentage tax on each utilities gross revenues, although some states (6) finance from general revenues. 40 The total budget of Etoss is 12.000.000 pesos, and compares, favorably, with the budgets state regulars in the US. 41 
43.
The Regulator has 130 people, and there are no programs to reduce costs. There has been some training courses, but not a full-fledged policy to create a fully capacitated, competitive, world standard regulator. Some personnel have already developed skills beyond their initial capabilities, but it is more the result of personal effort and of the regional impact of ADERASA (South American Association of Water Regulators) than of coherent national policies.
Institutional Adaptation
44.
Original regulation was much affected by rushed privatization, ideology, and the idiosyncrasies of the government of the time. Yet,
45.
Over time, and with untold difficulties, the regulator, the civil society, and the company, have initiated the development of important regulatory tools: User Commission, Tariff 
CONCLUSIONS
46.
There are several conclusions, that come out of the Buenos Aires Concession:
• The urgent requirements for drinking water supply and sanitation services of the concession area cannot be met by the methodologies and schemes established in the 1990s. In the case of services in Greater Buenos Aires, it is not feasible to continue with a system that depends exclusively on integrated and monopolistic management by the private sector and on absolute cost recovery in the short or medium term through rates charged to customers. This is particularly the case because, given current circumstances, private-sector companies would demand even higher levels of risk coverage for their capital investments than in the previous round. It is this coverage that results in high profit levels and higher utility rates that bear no relation to the payment capacity of most of the population.
• Both parties were aware that data were deficient . This should have prompted a more conservative approach, on both sides, to contractual commitments.
• Public utility services are not neutral to the socioeconomic mores of the environment where they perform. Their sustainability is affected by overall economic performance. Privatization is a formal procedure that does not, by itself, ensure sustainability, since its success depends on the quality of overall economic policies and economic growth. The main priority of the Argentinean Government was to ensure a stable rate of exchange. Resources were allocated accordingly. The impacts that such policy would have on growth and governance were not evaluated. They should have been evaluated, and should be considered in future privatization processes.
• The Buenos Aires Regulatory system was mostly based on contract regulation. In accepting contract regulation the parties ignored that contract regulation affects regulatory quality. • Future regulatory designs should set the basic regulatory instruments, enacted through regulatory law, and separated from the contract.
• The Buenos Aires regulatory structure was affected by the speed of the process, more related to macroeconomic and political concerns, than to the quality of both regulation and service. As a result baseline data were deficient, and the regulatory system ignored empirical information on 43 Phillips, op. cit. p. 130 critical regulatory issues in the water industry. In so doing the process ignored both American and European experiences.
44
• Future regulatory exercises should rely less on theories and beware of , and regulate for, proper management of critical regulatory issues. Relevant subjects include, but are not limited to: ensuring that the provider equity participation were of a level commensurate to the magnitude of the operation, providing for good-quality technical diagnostics and information before privatization, providing means to recalculate tariffs without altering the value of concession when reducing expansion obligations, controlling transfer pricing and intra-holding contracts, providing for proper accounting, determining adequate ratios regarding equity/debt financing, satisfying information requirements, assuring reasonable prices to both, providers and users; providing access to essential facilities and resources, empowering the regulator to adequately discharge its responsibilities, etc
• The American regulatory system provides good examples of both, regulatory issues, and regulatory tools. Its principles for both, normal and crises situation, should be more widely disseminated.
• International arbitration courts dealing with controversies associated to public utility services should apply the principles and rules accepted by civilized nations, when legislating, regulating, and adjudicating conflicts associated to the utilities sector.
• Governments and lending organizations should carefully consider the impact of special guarantees, such as rates of exchange, on the efficiency of service providers, macroeconomic national balances, contingent national liabilities, and equitable apportionment of national resources;
• Rate design should consider impacts on both expansion and targeted groups and be functional to policy objectives. Targeted subsidies should concentrate on demand expansions addressing needs of prioritized groups.
• Governments are responsible for policy design, selection of implementation tools and monitoring of implementation. Regulators should have legal powers, resources and independence to carry out their duties.
• The design of the Buenos Aires regulatory body illustrates a case of political reluctance to create and implement a truly independent technical regulatory system. The Regulator is a political body that was several times by-passed by politicians. Best practices and common knowledge on the subject were blatantly ignored. There is a need to restructure and improve the organization of the regulatory entity, particularly regarding independence and technical capacity.
• Bidding mechanisms, and other designs such as price cap systems are no substitute for adequate regulation. There is a need to refine competition mechanisms for awarding monopolies, with the aim of avoiding bid offers with predatory tariffs (to win now and negotiate later) and provide for a capital contribution from the successful bidder that represents a level of risk appropriate to the venture undertaken. • Structural design of privatization processes should include the analysis of the technological and economic feasibility of a vertical or horizontal separation of systems in order to award the concession to more than one operator. Inclusion of competition mechanisms -contestable markets-to be applied in particular in the areas subject to expansion
• There is a need for improved and increased use of methods for encouraging community involvement. Emphasis on making this type of involvement professional and specialized. Increased use of public hearings. Enhancement of information systems according to the needs of customers and public opinion 45
• Initiating a privatization process with faulty data, and inadequate public information, as well as on the basis of unheld premises is a prescription for conflict.
45
